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The New Shareholder Power
John C. Carter*
I. INTRODUCTION
The increased activism of pension funds, colleges, universities, and
other institutions that own equities in publicly held corporations is
now well established. This activism apparently arose from concern
by such institutions that they were being deprived by corporate man-
agers of the opportunity to profit from contests for corporate control.
Irrespective of whether corporate managers were acting to protect
the corporation or their own incumbency, many institutions objected
to the adoption of tender offer defensive devices that made it diffi-
cult, unlikely, or impossible for the shareholders to act upon a bona
fide proposal to take over the corporation. As a result, a growing
number of institutions have begun actively opposing such defenses, as
well as peripheral matters such as golden parachutes. In order to
protect themselves from pressure and retribution by corporate man-
agers, such institutions are also campaigning for a secret ballot. Be-
cause of the growth in institutional equity holdings in recent years,
these campaigns are a threat to management control and perhaps to
the corporations themselves.
II. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MARKET
A. In General
In hindsight one can faintly discern some of the factors leading to
the waxing shareholder power in the governance of public-issue cor-
porations. The first factor has been the significant growth in institu-
tional holdings of the equity securities of large public-issue
corporations. Charts 1 and 21 dramatically illustrate this growth
since 1950 and project it at an ever-accelerating rate to the year 2000.
* Professor of Law, Memphis State University School of Law. L.L.B., Chicago-
Kent College of Law; M.A., B.A., Lake Forest College.
1. Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, The Battle for Corporate Control; Management is Be-
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At the present time institutions own about 45% of the $3 trillion of
public-issue corporation stock outstanding. The percentage is much
larger among the Fortune 500 companies.2 Furthermore, institutions
account for between 70% and 80% of market trading.3 Institutions
thus dominate United States securities markets and securities
ownership.
A second factor that has led to increased shareholder power has
been the increase in contests for corporate control. The liquidation
values of many large United States companies became much greater
than their earnings value although the market price of the stock of
many such corporations generally reflected earnings value. Entre-
preneurs recognized that corporations were sheltering underutilized
and undervalued assets and determined that they could purchase the
corporations for more than the market value of the stock and turn
them over at a profit. This discovery also led many shareholders to
question the ability of corporate managers to manage corporate assets
in such a way that the market price of the stock would properly re-
flect both asset and earnings value.
B. The Institutions and Corporate Governance
Basic shareholder expectations, as well as the expectations of man-
agement, can be profoundly affected in several ways by a takeover
contest. In the first place, just as in the case of a merger, a takeover
bid represents a potential change of control. Secondly, the share-
holder who retains his interest in the target company faces the pros-
pect of future organizational changes over which he will have little, if
any, control. Lastly, and probably most significantly, the contest will
undoubtedly cause a substantial temporary advance in the market
price of the stock. Additionally, with respect to corporate managers,
an unfriendly tender offer contest puts careers at risk. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that corporate managers have designed a variety of
takeover defenses and that such defenses have caused concern to
some large shareholders.
In view of the extent of their ownership of corporate equities, insti-
tutions are in a position to take action to protect their perceived in-
terests. The tactics they have used include: (1) using the proxy
ing Assailed from All Sides. Who's in Charge Here?, Bus., May 18, 1987, at 104 [herein-
after Nussbaum].
2. D. Ruder, Remarks at the 27th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute (Oct. 11,
1988) (available from Securities and Exchange Commission).
3. Id.
1047
system to oppose poison pills, cumulative voting, staggered boards of
directors, fair price amendments and golden parachutes, and to pro-
mote secret ballots and give shareholders access to the proxy machin-
ery; (2) supporting raiders in specific contests; (3) attempting to
organize takeovers; (4) investing in leveraged buyouts.4
In comparison with past shareholder efforts, the use of the proxy
system by institutions has met with a substantial degree of success.
Table 15 lists the results in 1987 of shareholder proposals on corpo-
rate governance sponsored by selected institutions.
TABLE 1
Proxy Resolutions Filed
MOST
% HELD BY RECENT
TARGET SPONSOR TOPIC INSTITUTIONS VOTE
American Cyanamid CREF Poison Pill 55 28.4
AMR CaISTRS Poison Pill 75 45.9
Champion International UBC Poison Pill 59 33.2
Emery Air Freight SWIB Poison Pill 42 41.4
Great Northern Nekoosa CaPERS Poison Pill 68 40.2
International Paper CREF Poison Pill 57 27.7
J.C. Penney CREF Poison Pill 61 31.6
Pitney-Bowes CREF Poison Pill 68 32.6
United Technologies SWIB Poison Pill 51 32.9
Upjohn CaISTRS Poison Pill 56 40.0
Santa Fe Southern Pacific N/A Poison Pill N/A 61.2
US Air CalPERS Poison Pill N/A 51.9
Gillette CalPERS Greenmail 40-50 55.0
CaPERS - California Public Employees Retirement System
CalSTRS - California State Teachers Retirement System
CREF - College Retirement Equities Fund
SWIB - State of Wisconsin Investment Board
UBC - United Brotherhood of Carpenters
When one compares the results revealed in the table to the results
that were typically obtained in votes on shareholder proposals relat-
ing to social issues (rather than corporate governance issues), the rec-
ord is quite impressive. The writer does not know of one instance in
which a social issue received a majority of the votes cast. In fact, sel-
dom has such an issue received a vote of more than 10%. With re-
spect to corporate governance issues, however, in 1987 alone, issues
4. Eleven state retirement funds have provided a substantial fraction of the
Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts leveraged buyout fund. Kibbe, LBOs Cause Conflicts for In-
stitutional Investors, News for Investors, Jan. 1989, at 4, 5. In addition, various college
and university endowment funds have also invested in the fund. Id. Governors Cuomo
and Dukakis have each called for an end to such investments by their respective state
pension funds. Id.
5. Turnbow, The New Role of Institutional Investors-Positive or Negative 16
(Nov. 1988) (unpublished manuscript available in Memphis State University Law
Library).
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opposing poison pills were successful at Santa Fe and US Air Group,
and an anti-greenmail issue succeeded at Gillette. Furthermore, with
the projected increase in institutionally-owned assets and the com-
mensurate future growth of institutional equity holdings, the institu-
tional influence over business corporations will inexorably
strengthen.
Table 2 shows some of the resolutions sponsored by institutions in
1988.6 As of this writing the results are not available; however, in
view of the large institutional holdings in some of the companies
listed, it is likely that many of the resolutions will fare well.
The success of the institutions can be understood by analogy to the
close corporation. In the close corporation the shareholders, or at
least the majority group or individual, have control. This is because
corporate ownership is sufficiently concentrated so that a cohesive
group with a common interest can be identified. With the concentra-
tion of corporate ownership in institutions, similar circumstances in
publicly held corporations are arising. Shareholders, at least institu-
tional shareholders, are attempting to exercise a degree of control
hitherto unheard of in publicly held corporations.
C. The Corporate Response
1. In General
Corporate managers who oppose such institutional activity have of-
fered two general responses. First, they question the right of institu-
tional shareholders to participate fully in corporate governance. For
instance, Andrew C. Sigler, Chairman of Champion International
Corporation, has queried: "What right does someone who owns the
stock for an hour have to decide a company's fate?"7 Implicit in this
statement is the assumption that short-term shareholders have dif-
fering interests from long-term shareholders and that the corpora-
tion should be managed in the interest of long-term shareholders.
Secondly, some corporate managers have asserted the right to man-
age the corporation for the benefit of constituents, such as employees
and the communities in which company facilities are located, in addi-
tion to the shareholders themselves.
Consistent with the concept expressed by Sigler, many corporate
managers have questioned whether institutional shareholders should
have all of the rights of other shareholders. It is not completely clear
6. Id. at 18-19.
7. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 103.
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TABLE 2
Proxy Resolutions Filed in 1988
TARGET
Allied Signal
Alcoa
Alcoa
American Cyanamid
AMR
Bell & Howell
Boise Cascade
Champion International
Champion International
Coleman
Consolidated Freightways
Dayton Hudson
Dayton Hudson
Emery Air Freight
General Mills
Georgia Pacific
Gillette
Great Northern Nekoosa
Honeywell
International Paper
J.C. Penney
J.C. Penney
Kerr-McGee
Koppers
Lockheed
Loral
Martin Marietta
MCA
Panhandle Eastern
Phelps Dodge
Pitney-Bowes
Ryder System
Sara Lee
Telex
United Technologies
Upjohn
Upjohn
Upjohn
US Air Group
Weyerhauser
SPONSOR
SWIB
CalPERS
NYCERS
CREF
CaISTERS
CaPERS
UBC
NYCERS
UBC
SWIB
CalPERS
CaISTRS
CREF
SWIB
NYCERS
UBC
CaPERS
CaPERS
NYCERS
CREF
CaiSTERS
CREF
CREF
CREF
NYCERS
NYCERS
SWIB
UBC
SWIB
NYCERS
CREF
CalPERS
NYCERS
NYCERS
SWIB
CalSTRS
NYCERS
NYCRF
CalPERS
UBC
TOPIC
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Voting
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Voting
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Greenmail
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Voting
Golden Parachutes
Greenmail
Poison Pill
Voting
Poison Pill
Greenmail
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Voting
Voting
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Voting
Poison Pill
Voting
Voting
Voting
Poison Pill
Poison Pill
Voting
Voting
Poison Pill
Super-majority
for Mergers
% HELD BY
INSTITUTIONS
45
70
70
55
75
71
64
59
59
48
76
56
56
42
60
60
43
68
67
57
61
61
77
66
65
56
42
50
56
68
68
77
40
43
51
56
56
56
90
49
CalPERS - California Public Employees Retirement System
CaISTRS - California State Teachers Retirement System
CREF - College Retirement Equities Fund
NYCERS - New York City Employees Retirement System
NYCRF - New York State Common Retirement Fund
SWIB - State of Wisconsin Investment Board
UBC - United Brotherhood of Carpenters
how those who criticize voting by institutional shareholders would
restrict that voting power. One way is to give corporate managers, by
legislation or court decision, the power to take into consideration the
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interests of employees and customers, even though such interests
may be opposed to the interests of shareholders. Another method is
a leveraged buyout by management or the "going private" transac-
tion. Such actions, however, would impinge on the rights of all
shareholders, not just the institutional shareholders.
2. In the Creation of Tender Offer Defenses
Most limitations on takeover contest tactics are found in federal
rather than state statutes, although recently enacted state takeover
statutes appear to be gaining in significance. 8 These statutes, known
as "Control Share Acquisition Acts," provide that one who acquires a
specified substantial percentage of the voting shares of a corporation
incorporated under the laws of that state may not vote those shares
unless a majority of the remaining outstanding shares approve of the
acquisition. One such statute, the Indiana Control Share Acquisition
Act, has recently been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.9
This is not to say, however, that states exercise little other control
of tender offer tactics. Many cases decided under state law have
found directors in violation of their fiduciary duties in their use of
tender offer defensive tactics.' 0 A variety of defensive tactics based
on state law have been employed by target companies. Almost every
state permits staggered terms for directors,11 cumulative voting,12 the
issue of "poison pill" redeemable or convertible stock,13 and super-
majority voting requirements for shareholders.14 Furthermore, it
would appear that most state statutes also permit corporations to pro-
vide for generous severance benefits, sometimes called "golden
parachutes," for their executives and to take other action, such as the
8. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-17-3 (Burns Supp. 1988).
9. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986).
11. Every state except California permits staggered terms for directors.
12. Every state makes cumulative voting either mandatory or optional, with the
exceptions of Massachusetts and Wisconsin, both of which have no statutory provision
regarding cumulative voting for directors.
13. Every state follows the general pattern of the Model Business Corporation
Act, which provides that corporations may authorize the creation and issuance of
shares with different rights, preferences, or limitations. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 15 (2d ed. 1981). However, the majority of states limit conversion and redemption to
shares with preferential rights.
14. Hawaii, Illinois, and Nevada do not have a general section authorizing super-
majority voting requirements for shareholders but do provide for them in separate sec-
tions referring to specific shareholder actions. Puerto Rico has no provisions for super-
majority voting requirements for shareholders.
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sale of a particularly valuable property, known as the sale of a
"crown jewel"; the payments of "greenmail"; and the making of
"standstill agreements" calculated to make the company less attrac-
tive to a raider. Other defenses, like the issuance of super-voting
stock and stock with less than one vote per share are permitted
under some state statutes but not under others.15
It is not clear whether statutes that are permissive with respect to
tender offer defenses are in the interests of shareholders. The de-
fenses, which generally can be waived or avoided by directors, can be
in the interest of shareholders, provided that state courts enforce the
fiduciary duty of directors to act in the best interests of the share-
holders in response to a raider. So far there have been only a few
cases enforcing such a responsibility, and Delaware has clearly led
the way in recognizing that the duty exists.16 However, one can only
speculate whether, under the circumstances that have been
presented to Delaware courts, any modern court would reach the
same conclusion.
Another device that has been used as a tender offer defense is the
issuance of non-voting or super-voting stock. The issuance of non-
voting stock gives the controlling shareholders the ability to raise eq-
uity capital without any loss of control. The issuance of super-voting
stock gives those holding such stock a disproportionate influence in
shareholder votes. Super-voting stock comes in many varieties. For
example, the super-voting rights may take effect only upon the oc-
currence of a certain event or only with respect to certain issues. 17
15. The issuance of shares with fractional voting rights is prohibited in Connecti-
cut. All other jurisdictions, except Hawaii and Puerto Rico, have a statute expressly
authorizing the issuance of fractional shares. Louisiana requires that holders of frac-
tional shares be given the rights of shareholders except voting rights. The District of
Columbia, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, and Pennsylvania do not expressly designate the
rights of fractional shareholders.
16. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
17. The use of super-voting stock as a shark repellent is illustrated in Packer v.
Yampol, No. 8432, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 1986). In Packer, a corporation controlled
by the defendant issued to the defendant and another preferred stock having 140 votes
per share. The preferred stock also voted as a separate class on any proposed merger.
At the time of issuance, plaintiff had already commenced a proxy contest. The result
of issuing the super-voting preferred stock was that the defendant could block any
merger. Furthermore, options to purchase more of the preferred stock were issued to
defendant. They were fully exercisable in the event of a public tender offer. These
provisions were deemed by the court to make a successful tender offer extremely un-
likely.
The court observed that super-voting stock was statutorily permissible under Dela-
ware law, and that the decision of the directors would not be disturbed attributable to
rational business purposes. Defendant argued that the purpose of the issue was to
raise capital and that they were therefore protected by the business judgment rule.
The court noted, however, that the business judgment rule was available only to direc-
tors who are independent or disinterested with respect to the transaction under chal-
lenge, and found that the defendants did not qualify. The court went on to find the
purpose of the issue to be the maintainance of incumbent management control.
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The existence of non-voting stock or super-voting stock by a listed
company appears to be at odds with the so-called "one share-one-
vote" rule. In recent times there has been much discussion of this
rule, and one might have the impression that this rule either existed
at common law or is commonly found in state statutes. Neither is
true, however. At common law both per capita voting and other vot-
ing arrangements established by charter were permitted; however, it
was the rule that in the absence of any special charter provision, the
rule of one vote per share would be followed.1s
Today, variations of the "one-share-one-vote" rule are permitted by
the statutes of every state except Illinois19 and Hawaii, 20 while ear-
lier statutes simply permitted the issue of non-voting common stock.
Illinois requires one vote per share, but permits cumulative voting
and voting by class. The Hawaii corporate laws do not mention the
subject. Statutes generally acknowledge the right of the corporation
to issue shares with fractional or multiple voting rights.2 1
Although it is true that issuing non-voting or super-voting common
stock has not been proscribed by common law or state statutes, for
many years the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) prohibited the is-
sue of such stock by listed companies, whether or not the non-voting
stock itself was to be listed.22 Furthermore, the NYSE reserved the
right to refuse to list stock with "unusual voting provisions which
tend to nullify or restrict its voting, or which is subject to unusual
voting provisions of another class of stock having such effect, as, for
example, a situation in which one class of stock has the right to veto
the actions of another class."23
The criteria for trading by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) on the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) system or the American Stock Ex-
change, however, did not include any restriction on the ability of cor-
porations to issue non-voting or super-voting stock. As a
consequence, where the issue of such stock became popular as a
tender offer defense, several NYSE listed companies issued such
stock24 in spite of the NYSE rules and the Exchange came under
18. HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 124 (1983).
19. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.40 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1988).
20. Hawaii has no statutory provision on the subject of one vote per share.
21. See supra note 15.
22. NYSE Company Manual § A-15, at A-280 (1977).
23. Id. at A-282.
24. Brandow, The NYSE's One Share/One Vote Rule, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1985, at 33;
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pressure to repeal the rule.
The response of the NYSE was to pressure the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) to force the adoption of a similar rule by
the NASD and the other exchanges. This effort was successful. The
SEC has now promulgated a regulation providing that, with certain
specific exceptions a uniform one-share-one-vote rule shall apply to
shares to be listed on any exchange or the NASD.25
Another means by which corporations might restrict non-manage-
ment voting power is to create non-voting securities that are attrac-
tive to public investors. This evidently is the strategy on which the
recent proposal to market "unbundled stock units" is based. Such
units, consisting of a bond, a preferred share, and a warrant to
purchase a share of common stock, are issued in exchange for a por-
tion of the company's outstanding stock. The theory of the exchange
is to give the shareholder income protection by holding preferred
stock, capital protection by holding the bond, and the right to partici-
pate in appreciation by exercising the warrant. However, the unbun-
dled securities have no voting rights; they remain with the common
stock.
There are many unanswered questions concerning the sale of un-
bundled stock units, the first and foremost being whether the institu-
tions will be interested in buying them. Other questions concern the
extent of regulation and restrictions that will be imposed on the use
of unbundled stock units. The NYSE has already proposed restric-
tions intended to prevent an insider group from obtaining control by
using such a device and to prevent the disenfranchising of sharehold-
ers.26 If the marketing of unbundled stock was conceived of as a
means of protecting the corporate managers from the shareholders,
institutional or otherwise, it is doubtful that it will succeed.
One other way corporate managers can neutralize institutional vot-
ing is by exercising pressure of their own. The following report from
Business Week is illustrative:
Indeed, corporate managers are fighting back. By the time this spring's proxy
season drew near, many had appealed to their counterparts around the coun-
try for help in fighting the resolutions introduced by CREF [College Retire-
ment Equities Fund] and its fellow interventionists. Dozens of CEO's sent
letters to their colleagues urging them to persuade their own pension fund
managers to vote with management on anti-takeover issues.2 7
The response to such pressure has been a campaign by institutional
investors to compel corporations to adopt confidential voting proce-
see also O'Brien, Actions by Corporations Threaten Big Board Listing, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1,
1985, at 17.
25. Exchange Act Release No. 34-25891 [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 26,376 (July 12, 1988).
26. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1988, at 27.
27. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 106.
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dures. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center,
Inc., this emphasis "reflects the view of many shareholders that con-
fidential voting is fundamental to ensuring the integrity of the proxy
voting process."2 8
The federal agencies have acted to encourage this new activism on
the part of institutions. A major step taken by the SEC in December
1987, was the removal of a limitation that had previously kept the in-
stitutions from soliciting holders of more than twenty-five percent of
a company's stock in support of an issue.29 The Department of Labor
also has stressed to private pension fund managers that they are re-
quired to vote "in the best ultimate economic interest of the plan."30
III. THE SHAREHOLDER V. OTHER CONSTITUENCIES-THE PRIMACY
OF THE SHAREHOLDER
One of the responses to this heightened institutional activism has
been the claim by corporate managers that they have obligations be-
yond the interests of shareholders and the corporation. This idea is
not new. In 1929, Owen D. Young, then Chairman and Chief Execu-
tive Officer of General Electric Company, made the following
statement:
If there is one thing a lawyer is taught it is knowledge of trusteeship and the
sacredness of that position. Very soon he saw rising a notion that managers
were no longer attorneys for stockholders; they were becoming trustees of an
institution.
If you will pardon me for being personal, it makes a great difference in my
attitude toward my job as an executive officer of the General Electric Com-
pany whether I am a trustee of the institution or an attorney for the investor.
If I am a trustee, who are the beneficiaries of the trust? To whom do I owe
my obligations?
My conception of it is this: That there are three groups of people who have
an interest in that institution. One is the group of fifty-odd thousand people
who have put their capital in the company, namely, its stockholders. Another
is a group of well toward one hundred thousand people who are putting their
labor and their lives into the business of the company. The third group is of
customers and the general public.
Customers have a right to demand that a concern so large shall not only do
its business honestly and properly, but, further, that it shall meet its public
obligations and perform its public duties-in a word, vast as it is, that it
should be a good citizen.
28. Secret Ballot is a Growing Corporate Governance Concern, News for Investors,
Dec. 1988, at 225.
29. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-25217 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 48,977 (Dec. 29, 1987).
30. Franklin, 1988 Proxy Season: New Players, Rules May Aid Institutional Inves-
tors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7, 1988, at 5.
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Now, I conceive my trust first to be to see to it that the capital which is put
into this concern is safe, honestly and wisely used, and paid a fair rate of re-
turn. Otherwise we cannot get capital. The worker will have no tools.
Second, that the people who put their labor and lives into this concern get
fair wages, continuity of employment, and a recognition of their right to their
jobs where they have educated themselves to highly skilled and specialized
work.
Third, that the customers get a product which is as represented and that the
price is such as is consistent with the obligations to the people who put their
capital and labor in.
Last, that the public has a concern functioning in the public interest and
performing its duties as a great and good citizen should.
I think what is right in business is influenced very largely by the growing
sense of trusteeship which I have described. One no longer feels the obliga-
tion to take from labor for the benefit of capital, nor to take from the public
for the benefit of both, but rather to administer wisely and fairly in the inter-
est of all.3
1
Fifty-one years later Reginald H. Jones, a remote successor to
Young at General Electric, spoke before the Economic Club of Chi-
cago as follows:
It has been very difficult for management to stick to the business of managing
in the past decade. We have had to devote an inordinate amount of our time
and energy to the problems caused by our critics, by our legislators, and by
our bureaucrats. We have been buried under an avalanche of paperwork by
new agencies. We've been running to Washington and the state capitals to ex-
plain our needs, and very often, just to prevent legislative disaster. We have
made substantial and costly efforts to respond to the critics representing sin-
gle interest groups.... They all have significant points to make, but their pas-
sionate concerns have had the result of distracting management from its
central task of running a successful and productive business. 3 2
Although it cannot be said that these two statements are contradic-
tory, it must be realized that they emphasize different aspects of the
duty of a chief executive of a publicly held company. It is interesting
that the older concept expressed by Young is now being espoused by
many corporate executives in their opposition to takeovers and insti-
tutional shareholder activism.
Not only has the concept expressed by Young been held by many
corporate executives for many years, the same concept has found its
way into the courts. In Herald Company v. Seawell,33 shareholders
brought a derivative action claiming misuse of corporate assets by de-
fendant's implementation of an employee stock option plan, a news-
paper, evidently at least in part as a takeover defense. Sustaining the
plan, the court stated that it considered the company's obligation to
be threefold: to the stockholders, to the employees, and to the pub-
31. Carter, The Limit of Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 MERCER L. REV. 519,
535-36 (1982) (quoting Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARv. L. REV. 1145, 1154-55 (1931-32)).
32. R. Jones, Management Malaise (Dec. 16, 1980) (speech before the Economic
Club of Chicago).
33. 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
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lic.34 The court also observed:
'We have long since passed the stage in which stockholders, who merely in-
vest capital and leave it wholly to management to make it fruitful, can make
absolutely exclusive claim to all profits against those whose labor, skill, abil-
ity, judgment, and effort have made profits available.' . . . There is no ques-
tion but the... stock was purchased primarily to benefit the employees; this
benefit eventually gave monetary gain to the shareholders.3 5
Another case, Kelly v. Bell,36 recognized but limited the right of
the corporation to take into consideration the interests of constitu-
ents other than shareholders. In Kelly, an agreement under which
the United States Steel Corporation made an annual payment to Al-
legheny County, Pennsylvania in lieu of taxes, was challenged by a
shareholder as a waste of corporate assets. In upholding the agree-
ment the court declared it valid insofar as the expenditures were
made in the "reasonable belief that it would aid the public welfare
and advance the interests of the ... corporation and as part of the
community in which it operates."3 7 The court thus expressed very
clearly that, whereas a corporation might use corporate resources to
benefit the community in which it existed, it could do so only if the
action also resulted in a corporate benefit. Generally speaking, in or-
der to avoid being considered waste or ultra vires, the corporation it-
self, or its shareholders, must be one of the intended beneficiaries of
any corporate act. Thus, a corporation cannot make a charitable con-
tribution where it can be shown that such contribution is not related
to the interests of the corporation. Early cases seemed to require evi-
dence of a direct benefit;38 however, later cases have relaxed this
requirement.
An example of this relaxed requirement is found in A. P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow.3 9 The court in Barlow observed that
34. Id. at 1091.
35. Id. at 1096-97 (quoting Gallin v. National City Bank of N.Y., 152 Misc. 679, 703,
273 N.Y.S. 87, 113 (1934)).
36. 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969).
37. Id. at 74 (quoting A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 161, 98 A.2d 581,
590 (1953)).
38. In fact, many early cases held corporate contributions to be ultra vires. See
generally Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exchange Bank of Springfield, 16 Ga. App. 425, 85 S.E.
634 (1915); Stacy v. Glen Ellyn Hotel & Springs Co., 223 Ill. 546, 79 N.E. 133 (1906);
Western Md. R.R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co., 102 Md. 307, 62 A. 351 (1905); Davis v.
Old Colony R.R. Co., 131 Mass. 258 (1881); George v. Nevada Cent. R.R. Co., 22 Nev.
228, 38 P. 441 (1894); Memphis Grain & Elevator Co. v. Memphis & Charleston R.R.
Co., 85 Tenn. 703, 5 S.W. 52 (1887); Carter, The Limit of Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, 33 MERCER L. REV. 519, 523-24 & n.12 (1982) (citing Military Interstate Ass'n of
Savannah v. Savannah Thunderbolt & Isle of Hope Ry., 105 Ga. 420, 31 S.E. 200 (1898)).
39. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
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"modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and dis-
charge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the
communities within which they operate."40 The court also said that
"such expenditures may likewise readily be justified as being for the
benefit of the corporation; indeed, if need be the matter may be
viewed strictly in terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free
enterprise system." 41
In Barlow, the court perceives. a benefit furthering the corpora-
tion's long-term goals. The basic issue that runs through modern
cases concerning the power of a corporation to make contributions is
one of business judgment: is there a sufficient potential benefit to
justify the expenditures under the business judgment rule?
It is apparent from the cases that the law demands that corporate
resources be used in the corporation's own self-interest. As a conse-
quence it is difficult to see how a corporation can make an expendi-
ture for the benefit of employees, customers or the community,
unless there is some benefit to the corporation itself. For instance, it
is hard to understand how a corporation can be said to have any so-
cial responsibility to keep open an unprofitable plant. To do so would
run counter to the very reason for the corporation's existence. The
for-profit corporation is not the mechanism to solve the social
problems caused by the corporation's proper pursuit of profit. The
corporation cannot act in a significant way to solve social problems
when the solution would be to its detriment.
The obligation of managers to act in the interests of the corpora-
tion has its limits. Under certain circumstances they have an obliga-
tion to shareholders which transcends their obligation to the
corporation. Cases such as Smith v. Van Gorkom 42 and Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.43 define rather clearly those
circumstances. In brief, the obligation is present where the liquida-
tion or sale of the corporation is imminent. Then, as the Revlon
court said, "[t]he directors' role changed from defenders of the corpo-
rate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company." 44
The dispute between managers and institutional shareholders has
usually arisen in connection with the sale or takeover of a corpora-
tion. In such circumstances, courts have unequivocally found that
the corporate managers have a direct duty to shareholders. Neither
statutes nor case law impose on corporate managers similar duties to
other constituents such as employees or customers. Of course, how-
40. Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
41. Id.
42. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
43. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
44. Id. at 182.
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ever, the corporation itself has only those duties to constituents, that
it assumed by contract or that were imposed by legislation. The
writer concludes, therefore, that there is little, if any, basis in the law
for finding that corporate managers owe a duty to anyone other than
the corporation and its shareholders. Not only does a manager's re-
sponsibility under the law not extend to any of the other so-called
corporate constituents' the use of corporate funds for the constitu-
ents' sole benefit would undoubtedly constitute corporate waste.
IV. SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. In General
The other response of corporate managers to the increased institu-
tional activity in corporate affairs has been to suggest that institu-
tional shareholders should not have voting rights as extensive as
those of other shareholders.
Although the laws of every state contain language to the general
effect that the business affairs of the corporation shall be managed
by or under the direction of its board of directors, the shareholders
are also provided certain management rights. Shareholders' rights
include: the right to elect directors;45 the right to form shareholders'
agreements affecting the management of the corporation; 46 the right
to enforce by litigation the rights of the corporation;47 and the right
to participate in decisions affecting organic changes in the corpora-
tion.48 In addition, the right to have proposals for shareholder action
included in proxy statements is provided to shareholders of compa-
nies subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.49
B. The Historical Ineffectiveness of the Shareholder
The idea that shareholders, voting in proportion to their ownership
interest in a corporation, should have the right to elect the corporate
45. The corporation statutes of every state and the common law that existed prior
to their enactment provide for the election of directors by shareholders. In the earliest
corporations, the voting power of each shareholder was equal, rather than proportion-
ate to his share ownership. See Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations:
Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Man, One Vote", 56 CORNELL L. REV 1 (1970).
Although today the shareholder generally has voting power proportionate to his share
ownership, two devices to restrict it, super-voting and non-voting stock, have been de-
veloped, while one means of enhancing it, cumulative voting, has arisen.
46. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-302 (1988).
47. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-401 (1988).
48. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1988).
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managers has existed throughout modern times.5 0 Furthermore, the
corporation was conceived of as an organization in which sharehold-C
ers had exchanged their property right in corporate assets for a con-
tractual right against the corporation.5i Over time it came to be
recognized that, at least with respect to publicly held corporations,
the shareholder had to a large extent lost the ability, or desire, to en-
force this consensual right.52
This circumstance probably evolved naturally. One of the charac-
teristics of the corporate form is transferability of ownership, and the
securities markets in the United States were sufficiently organized to
make such transfer particularly easy. As a result, corporate owners
increasingly came to be investors with little, if any, interest in the
corporation itself. They abdicated their position of control, a role cor-
porate managers occupied in their stead. Thereafter, corporate man-
agers alledgedly tended to give priority to their own interests. 53
This was the state of affairs at the time of the enactment of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act).54 One of the underlying
themes of the Act was the revival of corporate democracy, and the
means chosen to accomplish this end was the requirement that, in a
broad variety of circumstances, material information be disclosed to
shareholders at the time their vote was solicited.55 The theory was
that shareholders would read and consider this information before
taking action and that corporate democracy would flower because the
owners would be informed before having to act.
It is doubtful, however, that this aspect of the Act ever had the de-
sired effect. In the 1970s, after several major instances of corporate
mismanagement were revealed-including the marketing of defective
products, unlawful political action and foreign bribery-a movement
arose, usually described as the corporate accountability movement, to
place some controls on corporate managers. 56
Although many changes in corporate practices were proposed, they
had no substantive impact on federal or state laws relating to share-
holder voting rights. Some companies modified prior practice by pro-
viding more information concerning director independence from
management and director committee activity in connection with the
50. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 196
(1932).
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 119-31.
54. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78a (1982).
55. See, e.g., id. § 78m-n.
56. See SEC Release No. 34-13482 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 81,130 (Apr. 28, 1977); SEC Release No. 34-13901 [1977-78 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,296 (Aug. 29, 1977).
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solicitation of proxies.5 7 Also, NYSE rules were amended to require
the existence of certain oversight committees of boards of directors;58
but legislative initiatives were largely unsuccessful.59 Furthermore,
much of the reformers' efforts were directed to the imposition of re-
straints on corporate managers rather than the improvement of the
shareholder franchise. For this reason one gets the impression that
although an informed shareholder vote was recognized as one possi-
ble form of restraint on the corporate managers, it was not consid-
ered to be a very effective one. Instead, the SEC and Congress
attempted to induce corporate managers themselves to make substan-
tial changes in the manner in which corporations were operated
through disclosure requirements. Enhancement of the shareholder
franchise appeared to be only incidental at best.
It must be admitted that the 1934 Act placed the shareholder in a
better position to exercise his right to vote by requiring that regis-
tered companies provide certain minimal information to those share-
holders from whom proxies are solicited. For the most part,
however, shareholders did not use the information to their advan-
tage. The writer knows of no recent instance in which a manage-
ment nominee for director of a publicly held corporation failed to
obtain shareholder approval, except where an organized proxy con-
test was waged by an opposing group vying for control. At most, the
enhancement of the shareholder franchise, appeared to be incidental.
This ineffectiveness has been widely recognized. In his book The
American Stockholder, published in 1963, J. A. Livingston quotes a
report of the Temporary National Economic Committee which states
that "unless there is a powerful nucleus of some sort, it is practically
impossible for hundreds of thousands of scattered holders of a major-
ity of stock of a giant corporation to get together even by proxy in
order to exercise a degree of control."60
As mentioned earlier, seldom, if ever, has a proxy vote resulted in
57. For example, some companies established nominating committees made up of
outside directors and indicated the membership of the committees in their proxy
statements.
58. NYSE Company Manual § A-2, at A-29 (1977).
59. Notable exceptions, however, do exist. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982), was adopted in response to dis-
closures of corrupt political activity overseas. It was also directed to disclosure. The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982),
was also a response to certain types of corporate corruption. Both pieces of legislation
were directed at the abuses themselves and made no attempt to affect corporate
governance.
60. J. A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 38 (Collier rev. ed. 1963).
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the unseating of a director unless there was an organized opposition
seeking control. In the latter case the shareholder could simply
choose one control group over another, with no assurance that a new
control group would operate the corporation any more in the inter-
ests of the shareholders than the former group. The interest of the
contending group would very likely be the value of control to them-
selves. Whichever group prevails, the shareholder remains an out-
sider. As this article suggests, however, significant changes are
occurring.
C Shareholder Power and Cumulative Voting
The idea of corporate cumulative voting has an interesting history.
The idea flowered from the argument of the philosopher, John Stu-
art Mill, on minority representation in government. Its first appear-
ance on the corporate scene was in the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
The principal advocate for its application to corporate governance
was the editor of the Chicago Tribune, Joseph Medill, who was also a
member of the Constitutional Convention.6 1 Cumulative voting be-
came quite popular, at one time appearing in the constitutions of thir-
teen states and being mandated by statute in many others. Today,
however, although permitted in every state, it is mandated in only
seven.62 Its theoretical effect is to enhance proportional representa-
tion among shareholders by providing power over corporate affairs
commensurate with a shareholder's ownership interest. The device is
of great utility in close corporations, but historically is of very limited
value in publicly held corporations.
In the close corporation there usually is no difference in identity
between managers and majority owners. As a consequence, a vote by
the owners is a vote by those in control. However, in the publicly
held corporation this is generally not true. The owners in a publicly
held corporation typically are in that weak position attributed to
them by Berle and Means.63 As a consequence, the rules relating to
voting for directors of publicly held corporations have been of rela-
tively little significance. With respect to the close corporation, how-
ever, they can be of great importance, especially with cumulative
voting.
The importance of cumulative voting in the close corporation is ap-
parent. In such an organization, all limitations in, or extensions of,
61. Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus.
LAw. 3 (Apr. 1955).
62. States in which cumulative voting is mandated are Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas,
Missouri, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
63. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 50, at 128.
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shareholder voting rights are important because, as stated above, the
vote of the shareholders is, in effect, the vote of the managers.
The advisability and utility of cumulative voting in publicly held
corporations is not as clear; however, those who have supported it
have argued it is the only way of assuring minority shareholder rep-
resentation: the owners have a right to a voice in corporate control;
the minority is assured that its views will be presented; it stimulates
shareholder interest; and it will have a healthy effect on corporate
management. 64 Conversely, the arguments of those opposed to cu-
mulative voting are: board continuity on significant long-range action
is needed; the presence of cumulative voting thwarts corporate opera-
tions and development; the majority position is superior because it is
generally based on more accurate information; corporate confidence
might be breached by the minority; and shareholders have other
means of protecting their rights. 65
As categorical statements, these pro and con arguments are not
compelling. It is difficult to understand how one can deny the value
of cumulative voting in some circumstances or the futility of it in
others.
With respect to publicly held corporations, until recently the con-
cept of cumulative voting was probably considered anti-management,
and there is historical justification for this view.66 Interestingly, in
the recent past there has been a revival of interest in cumulative vot-
ing. This time, however, it is the corporate managers, rather than
the outsiders, proposing the adoption of the device.
Actions such as the adoption of cumulative voting and a classified
board, on the recommendation of corporate management, have been
64. Dodd & Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 401 (1983).
65. Sell, Cumulative Voting, a Seemingly Endless Debate Topic, 2 CORP. PRAC.
COMMENTATOR 23, 27-28 (1960).
66. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 61, at 5-6, quoting a Chicago Tribune editorial
which appeared a few days prior to the vote on the Illinois Constitution of 1870:
The 3rd clause on "corporations" will forever prevent those confiscations of
the rights of stockholders by directors of which the Erie Railroad is a conspic-
uous and infamous example. The history of the Erie case shows that the blun-
der of having the majority only represented in any of the votes which decide
its government, results in ruling out, 1st, of a minority of all the stockholders,
in choice of directors, then of a minority of the chosen directors in the ap-
pointment of officers and an executive committee, and so on until at last, the
so-called "majority" consists of three persons, Gould, Fisk and Lane, who
owns not a thousandth part of the stock, and whose opportunities as thieves
immeasurably outweighs their nominal interest as stockholders.
Id.
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used as so-called "shark repellent" defenses. The purpose of the de-
fense is to delay the corporate raider's assumption of control for two
or three years, thereby frustrating real acquisition and dramatically
increasing the cost. However, such actions have not been taken to in-
crease the power of the shareholders. Instead, their purpose has
been to protect the corporation, or, perhaps, its managers, from a cor-
porate raid.
Although the use of cumulative voting for directors as a shark re-
pellent has not been very effective, it has been the only use by a pub-
licly held corporation that has had any effect whatsoever. As noted,
the device has not been used to protect the interests of shareholders;
however, with the increase in institutional voting power, it could con-
ceivably be used for that purpose.
D. The Shareholder's Right to Vote on Basic Corporate Changes
It has long been recognized that the corporation is a product of
contract. In its earliest consideration of the corporate form, the
United States Supreme Court held that the relationship between a
corporation and the state that granted its charter was contractual and
that, pursuant to principles of contract law, its terms could not be al-
tered by unilateral action.6 7
Furthearmore, the relationship between the corporation and its
shareholders, and among the shareholders themselves, is also con-
tractual. The terms of this contract are found in state corporation
statutes, in the general body of corporation law,68 and in the discre-
tionary terms adopted by the incorporators or shareholders. The
powers and duties of directors are also based on contract, the terms
of which are derived from the same sources. Though officers and
other employees are also governed by the law of agency, all relation-
ships within the corporation are essentially contractual.
If the shareholder derives his right from a contract it would seem
that his rights cannot be altered without his consent, unless the con-
tract itself provides for a means of altering such rights, and statutes
of every state provide such means. Specific procedures are set out for
the accomplishment of charter amendments, share exchanges, sales
of assets, corporate combinations and corporate dissolutions. Because
most modern state statutes reserve to the state the power to amend
its corporate statutes, states now generally have the power to make
unilateral amendments to the compact between the state and the cor-
67. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). But see inkfra
note 68 and accompanying text.
68. L.C.B. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (3d ed. 1969). Be-
hind [corporation statutes] is the general body of law and equity applying to all compa-
nies irrespective of their nature, and it is there that most of the fundamental
principles will be found." Id. at 8.
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poration and, through it, to the relationship between the corporation
and its shareholders.6 9
Absent a statutory provision, directors should not lack power to
participate in the amendment of the terms of a contract that is, for
all practical purposes, between the state and the shareholders. Fur-
thermore, the powers of directors have long been recognized to "ex-
tend only to the management of the regular business of the
corporation."70 Still, every state statute provides such power to
directors.71
69. The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) provides that "the [name of
state legislature] has power to amend or repeal all or part of this Act at any time .. "
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 1.02 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1986). Only Virginia has
adopted § 1.02 of the MBCA without change. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-602 (1981 &
Supp. 1988). All other states except Hawaii and West Virginia have provisions which
specifically authorize the legislature to amend or repeal state corporation laws. In 10
states, these provisions are found in the state constitution, while 24 states expressly
authorize the legislative body to prescribe regulations, provisions and limitations it
deems advisable. An amendment to state corporation law can affect the vested rights
of shareholders. Constitutional arguments based on the injunction against impairment
of the obligation of contracts, or the prohibition of the taking of property without due
process of law, have generally been unsuccessful. For older cases holding that the
state may not destroy vested rights by amendment of its corporate statutes, see Clear-
water v. Meredith, 68 U.S. 25 (1863); Schaffner v. Standard Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 150
Ohio St. 454, 83 N.E.2d 192 (1948); Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227
(1952). For representation of the modern view, see Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Mc-
Gowin, 271 Ala. 414, 124 So. 2d 812 (1980).
70. V. MORAWETZ, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 479 (2d ed. 1886).
Morawetz comments as follows:
[T]he exclusive powers of the board of directors extend only to the manage-
ment of the regular business of the corporation. Even an express provision
that the powers of the corporation shall be exercised by its board of directors
does not deprive the majority of the power of directing the general policy of
the corporation, and of deciding upon the propriety of important changes in
the company's business....
The general authority of the directors of a corporation extends merely to
the supervision and management of the company's ordinary or regular busi-
ness. A board of directors has no implied authority to make a material and
permanent alteration of the business or constitution of a corporation, even
though the alteration be within the company's chartered powers. Such an al-
teration can be affected only by authority of the shareholders at a general
meeting.
Id. See also Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders & Management in Modern Cor-
porate Decision Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969). In his article, Eisenberg observes
that "the corporate statutes were enacted in the context of this common-law pattern,
and generally served to perpetuate it". Id at 89.
71. For example, the Model Business Corporation Act provides: "All corporate
powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of
the corporation managed under the direction of its board of directors .... " MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1986). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5.101
(1986 & Supp. 1988). "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a
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However, directors can serve an appropriate function in the
amendment of the contract among the shareholders. Because direc-
tors are charged with the responsibility to act in the interests of all
shareholders, they can stand as a buffer for the minority against the
will of the majority. Majorities of varying size have the power under
all corporate statutes to amend the terms of their contracts with the
minority-a power unheard of at common law-this additional bar-
rier to the power of the majority seems appropriate as a result.
The right to vote on basic structural changes to the corporation is
probably the only shareholder's governance right that has been of
any real value to shareholders of publicly held corporations. Even so,
the individual shareholder has seldom had the-opportunity or the
power to make truly effective use of it. Instead, a single shareholder
has voted with corporate management, depending on them to make
the evaluation he is either unable or unwilling to make himself. The
fact that institutions are in a position to make their own evaluations
is unsettling to management, particularly where their evaluation is
contrary to management's.
E. Summary
The right of the shareholder of the publicly held corporation to
vote on basic corporate changes, as well as for directors, has been
protected by federal regulation and by state law,72 and is consistent
with the basic concept of the corporation. Although not all of those
who supply capital to the corporation need be given the right to vote
in all circumstances, there is certainly no basis for providing the right
to vote to one owner of stock of a particular class and denying it to
another. Although under state law corporations have the right to is-
sue classes of stock with differing voting rights, corporations listed on
an exchange or registered under the 1934 Act may not freely exercise
that right. There have been various proposals for denying voting
rights to short-term shareholders; however, such arrangements do
not seem to be legally possible at the present time. Recognizing that
the proposal is aimed at institutional voting, one must ask whether it
is advisable.
V. THE FUTURE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Concerning the future role of institutions in corporate governance,
one fact of overriding importance is apparent. Today institutions own
almost a majority of the shares of American corporations and their
board of directors except as otherwise provided in this code or by its articles of
incorporation."
72. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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percentage of ownership is expected to grow very rapidly in the next
decade. In the future, institutions and corporate managers are likely
to be jointly involved in questions of corporate control and manage-
ment, as the voice of institutional investors will continue to grow.
It is also apparent that the corporate takeover movement has acted
as a catalyst which has hastened the reaction of many corporate man-
agers to this new shareholder power. By identifying interests that
many institutions have in common, but which might be contrary to
the interests of corporate managers, the takeover movement has po-
larized and solidified the positions of the opposing parties, and has
particularly contributed to organizing the institutions into effective
power blocs.
It follows, therefore, that the debate concerning the proper role of
institutions in corporate governance has been carried out in the
wrong context. The question is not how institutions should act as
players in a takeover contest, but rather, how institutions should con-
duct themselves as the majority owners of many American corpora-
tions. In the most important sense the institutions are not the short-
term owners that they were characterized to be by Sigler.73 Instead,
institutions have more at stake in the future of American corpora-
tions than any other identifiable segment of the economy.
There has been much criticism of the short-term investment out-
look characteristic of institutions. It is true that institutional portfo-
lios turn over many times annually and that institutional trading
accounts for the bulk of market activity today. It is not clear, how-
ever, that longer term investment strategies would change the atti-
tudes of the institutions toward the opportunity to obtain a quick
25% to 100% return as a result of an unfriendly tender offer. Fur-
thermore, the overwhelming majority of non-institutional sharehold-
ers would undoubtedly also welcome such an opportunity. In fact,
among shareholders, the only discernable group that would likely
want to discourage such offers is management shareholders. One
cannot even assume with certainty that other employee shareholders
would oppose such an offer. It appears, therefore, that the actions for
which institutions are being criticized are simply those that most
shareholders would, in all propriety, take if it were within their
power. In any case, theoretically, the tender offer movement will
continue only so long as there are bargains in the securities markets
and, thereafter, the institutions will become more interested in the
73. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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long term health of the publicly held corporations as they should be.
According to the projections contained in charts 1 and 2 above, at the
end of this century, institutions will be twice as committed to corpo-
rate equities as they are today.
In view of the critical stake institutions have and will continue to
have, in American corporations, it would not be in their interests to
harm the American corporate structure. Further, it is not readily ap-
parent that either a short-term investment strategy74 or a strategy in
support of takeover contests is fundamentally detrimental to Ameri-
can corporations or the American economy.
Perhaps what is being observed is a basic realignment of corporate
power with the shareholder finally emerging as a force in the pub-
licly held corporation. As it always has, the law protects the primacy
of the shareholder as the beneficiary of the corporation and provides
a structure for the shareholder to govern. In the past, however, eco-
nomic factors have denied the shareholder the power to exploit this
position. Today, the institutional investor gives to the body of share-
holders some of the strength it has lacked, and it can only grow
stronger.
74. There now seems to be little doubt that institutional trading practices were a
major contributor to the market crash in October of 1987.
The 1987 October crash also revealed that there are limits to the liquidity of the
market. Consequently, any investment strategy based on unlimited market liquidity is
flawed, and it is understood that many institutions have revised market strategies to
avoid reliance on unlimited market liquidity; yet, they still have a short term orienta-
tion. However, they cannot avoid a long-term commitment to corporate equities.
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